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ABSTRACT
This analysis of nation-building and nation branding in post-colonial, multi-ethnic Suriname
builds on the notion that such policies are promising but also difficult to achieve in culturally
divided societies. We zoom in on three episodes of nation-building and nation branding in
the country and explain why and in what respects they succeeded or failed. We posit that in
Suriname’s case, nation-building and nation branding are intertwined, because the latter can-
not be seen in isolation from nation-building. In the Conclusion, we discuss the effects of
colonial legacies in multi-ethnic societies on nation-building and nation branding.
Introduction
“I am certain that Suriname can be a prominent voice on the world stage for cultural
diplomacy. We offer a model for how a healthy diversity can bring about a peaceful
and accepting society.”1 These words by Niermala Badrising, Suriname’s permanent rep-
resentative to the Organization of American States, reflect a well-documented shift from
material sources of power to nonmaterial means of influence in world politics.
Constructivist approaches of international relations highlight the importance of identi-
ties, norms, and various forms of “soft” power. Joseph Nye characterizes soft power as a
country’s “ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of oth-
ers.”2 Obviously, this kind of power is closely related to a country’s international reputa-
tion. In the case of Suriname, the question is whether the country can indeed be the
“prominent voice on the world stage” that Badrising envisions.
Nation branding could serve as an asset to this diplomatic strategy. We understand it
here as a means to (re)define the nation and national belonging in order to promote
the country to foreign parties. We view nation branding as a “logical extension” of
nation-building, which refers to the ways in which national identities are constructed
and communicated.3 Whereas nation building primarily refers to a domestic process in
which political elites (or state agents) attempt to overcome pre-existing cultural, ethnic,
linguistic, or religious divisions in order to forge a national identity, nation branding is
chiefly an externally oriented commercial enterprise to “sell” the nation by attracting
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foreign investors or tourists. Yet, especially for small states that lack military capacities,
nation branding and the projection of specific national identities abroad can also be a
fruitful approach to attain certain foreign policy goals or to gain recognition in inter-
national organizations.4 Nation branding strategies can, however, also have domestic
effects, because they can be employed by governments to enhance pride in the nation
and thus promote social cohesion.5 Seen from a more negative angle, nation branding
can be used by governments to stifle domestic criticism and undermine political oppo-
nents.6 By explicitly linking government policies to national identities and interests, pol-
itical adversaries can be brushed aside as outsiders who supposedly do not have the
nation’s best interest at heart.
Though nation-building and nation branding policies are in principle available to all
countries, we assert that the opportunities and potential benefits of such strategies
strongly depend on countries’ historical, demographic, cultural, and socioeconomic con-
ditions. For countries with colonial legacies, profoundly heterogeneous societies, and
weak economic foundations, nation branding can be promising—and perhaps even
necessary—to promote not only the country but also political emancipation and the for-
mation of national identities. On the other hand, precisely under such circumstances,
the opportunities for nation-building are likely to be restricted, because there may
hardly be any (historical) basis for shared national identities and pride. Moreover,
nation branding opportunities are also restricted when a country does not have a special
appeal to foreign investors or tourists. As a result, such societies can be regarded as
“most likely” to engage in nation-building and nation branding but may be “least likely”
to successfully implement such policies. The upshot could be that efforts at nation
branding may fail to materialize in the face of persistently unfavorable circumstances.
To examine how these challenges and opportunities play out in practice, we zoom in on
nation-building and nation-branding policies in a case with unfavorable circumstances:
Suriname. In this South American republic with a population of 590,000, various initia-
tives relating to nation-building and nation branding have been launched in recent deca-
des, but time and again these have been undermined by the country’s adversarial
economic, social, and political conditions. As a former Dutch plantation colony that
achieved independence only in 1975, Suriname’s population consists of several sizeable
ethnic and cultural groups that at different points in time were brought into the country
by Dutch colonizers to work on the plantations. The largest population groups in contem-
porary Suriname are Afro-Surinamese, (British) Indians or Hindostani, and Javanese.
Following a divide-and-rule strategy, the Dutch stimulated the formation of separate
cultural and political associations for each ethnic or cultural group in the colony, thus
undermining the building of a unified nation. In the early stages of the Afro-Surinamese
urban nationalist movement, some groups retained stronger orientations toward their
countries of origin than to Suriname. Moreover, many of these groups in fact favored a
continued semi-colonial relationship in order to complete their economic–political and
sociocultural emancipation processes. The contested independence in 1975, when a quar-
ter of the population left for The Netherlands and the complicated relationship with The
Netherlands—where approximately 350,000 people of Surinamese descent live—as well as
frequent economic boom–bust cycles further encumbered attempts at fomenting national
Surinamese identities. Our analysis thus highlights the tensions between nation-building
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and later nation-branding narratives of successive administrations and Suriname’s every-
day political and social reality.
To present our arguments, we begin with an overview of the relevant literature on
nation-building and nation branding, highlighting the merits and disadvantages of such
strategies as well as the conditions under which these initiatives are likely to succeed or
fail. Next, we introduce the case of Suriname and motivate our analytical approach and
use of source material. Through a chronologically structured analysis, we highlight three
episodes in Suriname’s history during which nation-building and nation-branding initia-
tives were launched. We first discuss two critical episodes during which Suriname
experimented with nation-building—the late 1950s and the early 1980s—followed by an
examination of nation-branding policies in the 21st century. We explore the context
and content of these initiatives and explain why and in what respects they succeeded or
failed. In the Conclusion, we underscore the relevance of our findings for the broader
literature on nation-building and nation branding, emphasizing the broader effects of
colonial legacies in multi-ethnic societies on nation-building and nation-branding strat-
egies and the connection between nation-building and nation branding.
Nation-building and nation branding
The process of nation-building refers to the creation of a nation, or a socially con-
structed or “imagined community,”7 that seeks to be politically sovereign. Whereas the
population of some states (such as China, Germany) already had strong national identi-
ties before the attainment of modern statehood, in others (including France and Italy)
the emergence of a centralized state preceded the existence of the nation, compelling
political elites to develop nation-building strategies. Seeking to foment national identi-
ties, nation-building aims to diminish or eradicate pre-existing ethnic, linguistic, or reli-
gious identities that are seen as contradictory to the national identity.8 Nation-building
can take many forms, including education policies or major infrastructure development
to trigger economic growth and political stability. In his seminal work Imagined
Communities, Benedict Anderson underlined the role of print media in creating com-
munities and building nations through spreading images. Thus, not only nationalist sen-
timents but also growing networks of communication created the nation. The
development of visual means of communication, including film and television and the
introduction of Internet and social media, such as Facebook, has further expanded the
role of media in nation-building and nation branding, as we also will show below.9
Here we refer to nation-building as a deliberate state effort to unify the people within a
country so that it becomes or remains politically viable and stable over the long term.10
In their pursuit of nation-building, political elites can explore a variety of strategies.
Obvious short-term (and often rather superficial) tactics could be the creation of
national flags, anthems, holidays, or sports teams. These objects of identification can
certainly strengthen feelings of national identity and unity but are by themselves mean-
ingless if they are devoid of any underlying sense of shared nationhood. If nation-build-
ing is, however, regarded as a more long-term and challenging endeavor, a more
imposing and structural strategy is needed. Nation-building policies of that kind com-
monly focus on education as the key mechanism, to make sure that a new generation
NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 175
speaks the same language, has a similar conception of the national history, and has a
shared reverence for national heroes and cultural icons. Though such policies may not
have any tangible effects in the short run, the historical experience of countries like
France demonstrates that their long-term effects should not be underestimated. Here
the political elite largely succeeded in their push to transform ethnically, linguistically,
and religiously divided populations into a more or less unified nation.
Nation-building clearly is a more daunting challenge in post-colonial states, espe-
cially in territories that were primarily used by the colonial power to extract resour-
ces or obtain other economic benefits. In Caribbean colonies, where European
colonizers virtually exterminated the indigenous inhabitants and most of the later
population consisted of enslaved Africans, the (near) absence of an original popula-
tion with strong cultural traditions complicated any foundation for the development
of national identities. Furthermore, some Caribbean countries, including Guyana,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname, contained a profoundly multicultural and
multi-ethnic population due to a sequence of (forced) migration movements from
different regions of the world. As in many multi-ethnic societies in Africa and Asia,
colonial rulers here often stimulated animosity and rivalry between different groups
through divide-and-rule policies. As a consequence of their extractive colonial heri-
tage, lack of a substantial indigenous population, and multi-ethnic and culturally het-
erogeneous populations, these Caribbean countries are probably among the weakest
candidates for successful nation-building policies. As the most ethnically heteroge-
neous state in the Caribbean, Suriname arguably faced the most formidable challenge
in this regard. The question of how to reconcile an inclusive Surinamese identity
with exclusive ethnic identities has dominated Suriname’s nation-building efforts. As
will be shown below, the effort to create one identity turned out to be caustic. The
alternative is to embrace and even celebrate diversity.11
In contrast to long-existing studies of nation-building, the extant scholarly literature
on nation branding is fairly new and varies significantly because of the different
approaches to the topic. Nadia Kaneva divided these publications into roughly three cat-
egories: technical–economic, political, and cultural.12 Simon Anholt may be the most
well-known author in the first category. He emphasizes the economic and competitive
aspects of nation branding. From a political perspective, branding is a promotional tool,
especially for small, peripheral nations such as Suriname, to boost their international
position, particularly in the field of economics and finance.13 Publications using the cul-
tural approach critically assess nation branding’s implications for socioeconomic power
relations, national identities, and ideas about nationhood.14
We view nation branding through the lens of all three categories as a “set of dis-
courses and practices located at the intersection of the economy, culture, and
politics.”15As stated above, nations have long expressed themselves through symbols
such as flags or anthems, but the use of commercial branding techniques to reach inter-
national audiences is a rather new, global phenomenon. According to Sue Curry Jansen,
nation branding transforms civic space into a commercial space.16 The state hires
branding experts to advise on how to create and sell an attractive and recognizable
image abroad but also at home. In their marketing campaigns, political elites use extant
images, products, places, and sometimes internationally famous individuals to sell their
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product (country). Thus, governmental and nongovernmental actors work together to
(re)shape the image of the country; to (re)charge the economy by promoting tourism,
international investments, and trade; and also to establish or enhance the country’s pro-
file in international organizations.17
Equally important, branding is also a tool to mobilize self-respect and national pride
in the nation; it thus has a clear domestic component as well.18 This is where nation
branding links up with—or can be seen as an extension of—nation-building, because in
both strategies emotions and symbolism are essential parts of the package. In other
words, nation branding is not only about marketing but is also an asset used in the
political–ideological mission to build a nation. In nation branding such sentiments are,
however, tied to commercial interests.
As mentioned earlier, in terms of domestic politics, nation-building and nation-brand-
ing strategies can also be employed to silence opponents or quell resistance to the political
regime. It is not a coincidence that many post-colonial states had dominant party systems
headed by charismatic independence leaders in the immediate post-independence period,
whose rule tended to become increasingly authoritarian, and corrupt, as their terms in
office became longer. Though these leaders to varying extents succeeded in creating a
sense of shared nationhood among their populations, a heavy price was often paid in terms
of democratic pluralism. As is the case with nation-building, the line between nation
branding and propaganda is very thin as well. For this reason, nation branding can be
directed at external audiences for primarily economic purposes but might also be pro-
jected domestically in order to shore up support for the ruling elite.
The case of Suriname
As the discussion above reveals, though the global literature on nationalism and nation
building is vast, so far these are not prominent issues in publications on Suriname. On
the one hand, this reflects a scholarly trend in which small countries tend to be
excluded from comparative research.19 On the other hand, it may also be explained by
the country’s complex past. Suriname is a colonial creation, built under European
hegemony by enslaved Africans and Asian indentured laborers and their descendants.
Capitalist exploitation of plantations and natural resources and (forced) labor migration
determined the colonial hierarchy and consequently the development of ethnic relations.
History plays an important socioeconomic and political role, as described by Bridget
Brereton when analyzing the process of creating a “universal” narrative in multi-ethnic
Trinidad and Tobago: the past is “a key arena for contestation” in a dynamic and com-
plex society.20 In both Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname, rootedness, economic con-
tributions, past experiences of exclusion and other grievances and traumas, as well as
loyalty are arguments to support claims on the nation by different groups.
The Dutch ruled Suriname from the mid-17th century, yet the white population of
the colony was mixed, including Germans, Swiss, French, and Scots. The original
Amerindian inhabitants nowadays count for approximately 4% of the population.21 As
in other Caribbean territories, the main labor force consisted of enslaved Africans
before the abolition of slavery in 1863. At present, the Afro-Surinamese population can
be subdivided into a Creole segment (16%) and a fast-growing Maroon segment (22%).
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Maroons are Afro-Surinamese who escaped from slavery and formed autonomous set-
tlements in the interior. There are six different Maroon populations, of which the
Saamaka and Ndyuka (or Okanisi) are the largest. After the abolition of slavery, more
than 30,000 indentured laborers from British India arrived, and this “Hindostani” group
(including Hindus and Muslims) now comprises 27% of the population. At the dawn of
the 20th century, a slightly smaller group of indentured laborers arrived from the Dutch
East Indies (contemporary Indonesia). At present, the Javanese constitute close to 14%
of the population. A third, much smaller, group of indentureds were of Chinese descent.
Finally, more recent immigration movements have resulted in smaller Haitian,
Brazilian, and (new) Chinese segments, and the group who self-identify as “mixed” was
13% in the 2012 census.22
As this overview reveals, Suriname always had a diverse population. Yet until World
War II, the non-white population of Suriname had very limited political rights, because
the country was governed by Dutch officials and a small white or light-colored elite. This
changed in the decades between World War II and independence in 1975, which was a
time of economic growth and increasing political and cultural awareness.23 As in most
post-colonial societies, the Surinamese state preceded the nation. In the case of Suriname,
independence mainly was a constitutional break with the past, because there existed no
official conception of how the new republic was to proceed as a nation. In fact, large seg-
ments of the Surinamese population opposed independence, and in his dissertation with
the English subtitle “Nation Building as a Challenge,” Edwin Marshall concluded that the
nationalists had been naïve: “They also had the simple belief that nation building was an
autonomous process that would develop itself after independence.”24 But past and later
experiences indicate that this was a complex challenge.
We argue that Suriname slowly but surely has adopted an “accommodationalist”
approach to nation-building: differences are respected and even authorized by the state
as it permits schools, places of worship, sociocultural associations, and holidays of the
various ethnic groups on an equal footing. As a result, nation-building in Suriname has
not been accompanied by any attempts to weaken cultural and ethnic identities but, in
fact, the relatively harmonious relations between different Surinamese groups have served
as a source of national pride. Surinamese proudly point to the adjacent synagogue and
mosque in central Paramaribo, which is an emblematic symbol of accommodative inter-
confessional attitudes. Though Surinamese rulers have therefore certainly allowed differ-
ent population segments to retain their cultural traditions and autonomy, in return they
expect and even demand loyalty to the state, its institutions, and the general law.25
Following this description of the contours of the Surinamese case, in the next sections
we explore the nation-building and -branding policies that have been enacted. To develop
our arguments, we zoom in on three critical episodes in modern Surinamese history.
Whereas the discussion of the 1950s and 1970s–80s will center on nation-building strat-
egies, the discussion of the 21st century will foreground nation branding policies instead.
The 1950s: Nation-building in the context of emancipation
In many African, Asian, and Caribbean colonies, in anticipation of decolonization and the
attainment of statehood, independence movements in the 1940s and 1950s transformed into
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dominant political parties that claimed to represent the entire population in its struggle
against an illegitimate colonial power.26 These parties therefore practically embodied the
national interest and had active nation-building strategies, often to the detriment of a vigor-
ous political opposition. The Indian National Congress in India, the Tanganyika African
National Union in Tanzania, and the Convention’s People’s Party in Ghana are just a few
examples of such parties, which were all spearheaded by charismatic leaders (Jawaharlal
Nehru, Julius Nyerere, and Kwame Nkrumah, respectively) who embodied the struggle for
national emancipation. Though perhaps not ideal from a democratic perspective, the absence
of a powerful opposition in these countries clearly enabled political parties and their leaders
to formulate and implement effective nation-building policies.
Such dynamics could not be witnessed in Suriname. The first movement for auton-
omy originated in World War II when the urban, light-skinned, educated Creole elite
advocated self-governance, not independence, for the colony. This was achieved in
1954, when Suriname obtained the status of an autonomous country in the Kingdom of
The Netherlands. Earlier the introduction of universal suffrage in 1948 prompted the
organization of the first political parties. Virtually all of the parties (in the 1949 elec-
tions, 13 parties and eight individual candidates contested 21 parliamentary seats) repre-
sented and catered to specific cultural, religious, and ethnic groups.27 In terms of
nation-building, this entailed that no party was able to legitimately present itself as the
advocate of the national Surinamese identity or interest, hampering attempts at nation-
building. As its name indicates, the only party claiming to represent the national inter-
est was the National Party of Suriname (NPS),28 but in practice it primarily represented
the urban Creole elite, which regarded itself as the protagonist of the national struggle
for autonomy and (cultural) decolonization.29 Though independence movements that
transformed into political parties in most other Caribbean colonies were able to govern
alone for a protracted period of time in both the pre-independence and immediate
post-independence eras, in Suriname the absence of a national independence party pre-
cluded this. Instead, political parties representing different ethnic groups had to cooper-
ate in coalition governments, much along the lines of Arend Lijphart’s consociational
model.30 From the early 1950s until the late 1960s, the Creole NPS, by that time advo-
cating the emancipation of the dark-skinned Creole working class, the Hindustani
VHP,31 and the Javanese KTPI32 formed such governments. “Fraternization politics”
(verbroederingspolitiek) made the focus of political leaders on politically emancipating
their own group, ensuring access to state resources, as a result of which Suriname man-
aged to avoid open hostility or violence between ethnic groups.
We have argued elsewhere that this “fraternization” could only take place in econom-
ically prosperous times when jobs and resources could be divided between the different
partners.33 In fact, different ethnic groups and their leaders remained suspicious of each
other, and both Creole and Hindostani leaders used the fear of political domination of
the other group to mobilize their own voters. This practice, known as apanjaht politics,
or “the practice of voting for your own race, your own kind,”34 effectively cemented
ethnic politics in a process known as “ethnic outbidding.”35
Fraternization politics was clearly linked to the political emancipation of the urban dark-
skinned Creole, Hindostani, and Javanese masses. Another development has been less
noted: the almost paradoxical link between fraternization and nationalism. Early nationalism
NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 179
in Suriname was mainly cultural, but in the early 1960s political nationalism became more
prominent. Peter Meel analyzes how the Emanuels administration (1958–61) used fraterniza-
tion to actively pursue decolonization by stimulating a harmonious development of
Suriname and its inhabitants.36 To support this aspiration, a flag, a national anthem, and a
national coat of arms were introduced in 1959. These symbols of harmony, unity, and soli-
darity were seen as a way to overcome ethnic division and competition.
The other, related goal of the Emanuels administration was to change the constitutional
ties with The Netherlands in order to gain more freedom to intensify international trade
and to pursue a more independent foreign policy but not constitutional independence.
When the 1961 conference to revise the constitutional relationship within the Kingdom of
The Netherlands failed, it gave the cultural–nationalist movement a new, political boost.
Yet this movement did not have a multi-ethnic stamp but rather a Creole stamp. Until
that time the largely urban Creole movement had focused on a re-evaluation of Afro-
Surinamese culture and a rejection of Dutch linguistic domination and Christian values.
In this cultural renaissance, the emancipation of Sranan Tongo, the country’s lingua
franca, was of utmost importance. Cultural emancipation was seen as a first step toward
political emancipation. The Emanuels government supported this aspiration and, for
example, included a stanza in Sranan Tongo, written by the well-known poet Trefossa in
the national anthem.37 It thus supported cultural nationalism and at the same time weak-
ened its commitment to overcoming ethnic difference.
The failure of the 1961 negotiations jolted the nationalists into politics: the cultural move-
ment morphed into a political party, with the telling name the Party of the Nationalist
Republic.38 The new party did not attract a large following. According to Meel: “The mass
nationalism the PNR [Party of the Nationalist Republic] favoured remained limited to an
elite nationalism.”39 Thus, Creole nationalism did not have a universal appeal and instead led
to counterreactions of intensified ethnic consciousness within other ethnic groups that were
alarmed by nationalism and nationalist ideas and their possible outcome: independence.40
Consequently, Afro-Surinamese nationalism led to rising animosity between ethnic
groups, as Hindostani and Javanese suspected the Creole nationalist ambitions and
Creole elites feared to lose their prominent position in society to the increasingly assert-
ive and growing Hindostani middle class.41 Not surprising, independence became a
focal point of these antagonisms, and in the late 1960s fraternization policy and the
grand coalitions gave way to an Afro-Surinamese-dominated government headed by
NPS leader Henck Arron.42 Much to the dismay of Hindostani and Javanese voters and
politicians, this government paved the way for independence, alienating large segments
of the population in the process. In turn, the politicization and polarization of the inde-
pendence question effectively barred the Arron administration of any opportunities at
nation-building. In conclusion, though nationalism and nation-building strategies cer-
tainly could be detected in 1950s Suriname, the fact that these were so closely tied to
one ethnic group meant that they actually had an adverse effect.
The 1970s and 1980s: From independence to a military regime
As in other Caribbean or African and Pacific small states, Suriname’s independence was
not the result of a mass independence movement that had wide popular support but
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was in fact also strongly driven by the former metropole, The Netherlands, which
wanted to cast off its last colonial possessions.43 As in Malta, Seychelles, and most
Anglophone Caribbean islands, the question of political independence strongly divided
the Surinamese population: many preferred to retain constitutional ties with The
Netherlands. In contrast to homogenous small states, however, in Suriname the issue
was politicized along ethnic lines, and independence was broadly regarded as a Creole
project. Independence was approved only by the smallest parliamentary majority in
1974, and in the period 1970–80, 120,000 Surinamese emigrated to The Netherlands,
with a high of almost 40,000 emigrants in 1975 alone, signaling a lack of confidence in
an independent Suriname. Losing approximately one quarter of its population, this
mass migration movement sapped the newly independent country of much of its human
capital. Furthermore, to this day the presence of a sizable diaspora in The Netherlands
complicates the nation-building process in Suriname, leading to recurrent questions
about belonging, loyalty, and the foundations of Surinamese identity.44
Nation-building had not been a major consideration of politicians in Suriname or The
Netherlands. As Jan Pronk, one of the main Dutch architects of the decolonization pro-
ject, admitted 20 years after the fact: nation-building had been neglected to the detriment
of Suriname’s development.45 Perhaps not surprising given the country’s history of
nationalism, the main efforts at nation-building came from artists.46 Probably the most
quoted Surinamese poem is Wan Bon (One Tree) by Dobru (Robin Raveles): “One tree /
So many leaves / One tree [… ] One Suriname / So many hair types / So many skin col-
ors / So many tongues / One people.”47 Another iconic example of cultural nation-build-
ing is the 1976 movie Wan Pipel (One People) by Pim de la Parra. It tells the story of
the Afro-Surinamese Roy who lives in The Netherlands but returns to his homeland to
say farewell to his dying mother. Here he falls in love with Rubia, a Hindostani woman,
and decides not to return to The Netherlands because he feels a need to discover
Suriname.48 Wan Pipel is the first movie made in the Republic of Suriname and each
year on the eve of independence it is shown on Surinamese television.
Instead of nation-building, economic development was the main priority of the
Arron administration. Yet economic stagnation, perceived political incompetence,
mounting ethnic tensions, and widespread corruption eroded the legitimacy of the
democratically elected Arron government. When 16 noncommissioned officers commit-
ted a coup d’etat in 1980, this was seen as a positive development by many Surinamese
people and, incidentally, some politicians in The Netherlands.49 They hoped that the
military could put an end to the ineffective and corrupt coalition governments.
Importantly, the military vowed to bring an end to the “old politics” based on ethnicity,
instead signaling its intention to defend the national interests of Suriname and to repre-
sent all Surinamese of different ethnic backgrounds. The military allowed the use of
Sranan Tongo in parliament for the first time, and as state secretary of culture, the
nationalist poet Dobru of Wan Bon became one of the defenders of the military regime
and its attempts at “Surinamization.” Independence Square in Paramaribo featured
Cuban-style picture boards showing the heroic history of the Surinamese people in its
struggle for freedom. Ironically, this type of propaganda made nation-building and
Surinamization after the fall of the military regime a radioactive issue for many years to
come. The regime was associated with human rights violations, extensive corruption
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and drug trafficking, and economic collapse, resulting in widespread poverty and food
shortages. The great majority of the population equated nationalism with this unpopular
regime that brought the country to the brink of collapse.50 With the return of democ-
racy and the old ethnic parties, in 1987, Dutch—considered to be ethnically neutral—
was reaffirmed as Suriname’s official language. Sranan Tongo continued to be viewed as
principally part of Afro-Surinamese culture.51
On the international stage, coup leader Desire Delano (Desi) Bouterse proclaimed his inten-
tion to decrease Suriname’s dependence on The Netherlands, seeking instead to forge new
political alliances in the region and beyond, including Cuba, Libya, and Ghana.52 The domes-
tic and international reputation of Bouterse’s regime was, however, shattered by the so-called
December Murders of 1982, when 15 prominent opponents of the regime were tortured and
executed. In response, and under pressure from the Surinamese diaspora, The Netherlands
and its Western allies severed ties with the Surinamese government, and the country obtained
the status of an international pariah.53 The regime’s image was further tarnished when
Bouterse and some of his family members were associated with narcotics trafficking with
Colombian drug cartels, eventually leading to Bouterse’s conviction in absentia to a 15-year
prison sentence for cocaine smuggling by a Dutch court. As a result, Suriname’s international
image reached a nadir, obstructing any attempts at branding or selling the nation abroad.
In terms of nation-building, Bouterse’s vow to end ethnic divisions in Suriname was
further crushed by the eruption of the so-called Interior War (Binnenlandse oorlog), a
conflict between the Surinamese military and Maroon insurgency groups, who rallied
behind Ronnie Brunswijk’s Jungle Commando.54 The conflict centered on control over
the resources and cocaine trafficking networks in the vast Surinamese interior. Various
war crimes were committed by both sides, including the killing of 39 innocent Maroon
civilians in the village of Moiwana by the military in 1986. Though Maroons had hith-
erto not played a significant role in Surinamese politics, the Interior War and the socio-
economic, cultural, and physical dislocations caused by the fighting activated this
group’s political awareness and emancipation, effectively intensifying the political frag-
mentation and further undermining national unity.
Though nation-building was thus an explicit aim of the military regime, the increasingly
negative perceptions of the regime contaminated Surinamese nationalism. The combin-
ation of external pressure, enduring economic stagnation, and civil war forced Bouterse to
embark on a path toward political liberalization in the late 1980s. Free and fair elections
were held in 1987, resulting in a landslide victory for the old ethnic parties (NPS, VHP,
and KTPI) united in the Front for Democracy and Development. Subsequent years were
characterized by power struggles between the democratically elected government and the
military, but the end of the Interior War and a second electoral victory of the Front coali-
tion in 1991 solidified Suriname’s democratization process. Relations with The
Netherlands were restored and the economy improved, meaning that since the late 1990s
opportunities for nation-building and nation branding were decidedly better.
The 21st century: Nation-building and nation branding
In 2013 banners and giant posters congratulated the population of Suriname on the
anniversaries of 140 years of Hindostani immigration, 150 years of the abolition of
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slavery, and 160 years of Chinese immigration. The heading of the banner read, “As
nation … forward together / However we came together here.” This corresponds to the
third line of the national anthem. Two years later, during the 40th anniversary of inde-
pendence, banners signed by “His Excellency President Desire Delano Bouterse” urging
“unity and harmony” bedecked government buildings (Paramaribo 2013, 2015).
Thus, Desi Bouterse returned to the national stage after his disastrous military inter-
vention. He actually never faded from prominence: with the re-democratization of the
country he founded the so-called pan-ethnic National Democratic Party.55 After a hesi-
tant start, the NDP became a political force to be reckoned with and actually gained the
presidency in the person of Jules Wijdenbosch.56 In the 21st century the NDP increas-
ingly presents itself as the people’s party, attracting many young voters who have no
memories of the events in the 1980s. Bouterse now moved front stage and was elected
president in 2010 and again in 2015.57
In shows for foreign visitors or at international festivals, the state also prefers to present
itself as a diverse but harmonious nation. In the words of theater maker Sharda Ganga:
“The central element is the display of our wealth of ethnicities; each ethnic group is
depicted separately through a parade of traditional costumes, song and dance—each group
gets a chance to demonstrate their culture separate from the rest; in the end there is a com-
ing together in a climax of all ethnic groups—a spectacle of unity.”58 In short, these exam-
ples show that the state has now embraced Suriname’s diversity and made this a
cornerstone of the national identity.
Interestingly, politically this is translated into more general acceptance of the
Hindostani VHP’s originally anti-Creole nationalism slogan “unity in diversity.” The
Afro-Surinamese NPS also has “adopted cultural pluralism as the sole attainable strategy,
balancing the ideal of acculturation with the actuality of ethnocentrism.”59 The themes of
diversity and harmony also have become important in nation-branding efforts to attract
foreign tourists and investors to Suriname. The most visible output is by the Suriname
Tourism Foundation, a government–private partnership founded in 1996 by the Ministry
of Transport, Communication, and Tourism and the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry. It is in charge of tourism promotion and development by creating “an attractive
image” and by “branding Suriname as a tourist destination.”60 Given the country’s trad-
itional reliance on natural resource exploitation, tourism is frequently mentioned as an
opportunity to diversify Suriname’s economic base.61 The Foundation’s goal is to make
Suriname a global brand to attract tourists from all over the world instead of only visitors
“from the diaspora,” who now constitute the majority of tourists. Because they often reside
with family, they are not the most commercially attractive group to the local economy.
In recent years, the Tourism Foundation has issued a number of guides with different
themes. The 2012 Official Tourist Destination Guide was entitled “Green Caribbean.”
Despite its title it lauded Suriname’s multiculturalism: “Suriname is also called a large
melting pot of different cultures where the roots from their own soil are mixed with
those from far away, which have merged to become the harmonious people of
Suriname. Indigenous, African, Indian, Chinese, Indonesian and European descendants
all live together in peaceful harmony.”62
A later, undated guide, “Suriname, A Colorful Experience … Exotic beyond Words”
promised that a vacation in Suriname would be “an inimitable medley of authenticity,
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nature, culture, heritage, and events.” Now the focus was on the natural beauty and
authentic traditions of the country: “In Suriname you encounter jungle that has not pre-
viously been entered, Amerindian and Maroon populations that have retained their cen-
turies-old traditions.”63 Nature again features prominently in the Official Tourist
Destination Guide from 2017, titled “Suriname: Earth’s Greenest Treasure.” Even though
the “unique people from different origins” are mentioned, the focus is on the “pristine”
rainforest and the “magical panorama of the jungle.” The Maroon and Indigenous pop-
ulations are again exoticized as “tribes with well-kept ancient traditions and habits.”64
Such presentations of the authentic “Other” are problematic in terms of nation-building
because they tend to keep these groups in their exotic box and thus exclude them from
the general population/nation. The Foundation’s website “Discover Suriname” features a
sleek, short video “Suriname: A Colorful Experience” promoting highlights in the rain-
forest and the capital accompanied by an international sound.65 Despite the fact that
the Tourism Foundation seems to have no consistent message yet, it is obvious that in
recent years concepts such as “authentic” and “unspoiled” and its implication of no
mass tourism have become more important than unity and diversity.66
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided a different message in 2015, an election
year, when it proudly presented a new branding campaign, We Are Suriname (or
#WEARESURINAME), interestingly without consulting or informing the Tourism
Foundation. Foreign Minister Winston Lackin underlined the importance of nation
branding: “We want to show the world who we are, why we are as we are, where we
want to go, and why we want to do so.” The focus was on New York, as the center of
the world, messaging that Suriname’s real asset was “its harmonious and peaceful soci-
ety” (thus echoing the words of Ambassador Badrising at the beginning of this article)
and that during the 40 years of independence “divisions have been transformed into
positive energy … we have to invest in our best resource: the Suriname people.”67
Suriname’s embassies around the world were to be pivotal in spreading this message.
The campaign was part of the calendar of events celebrating Suriname’s 40th anniver-
sary of independence, because it was supposed to climax on independence day.
The campaign’s main feature was a video featuring Surinamese artists Lakeli, Benaja,
and Enver with the song “We Are One” while showing cliche images of the rainforest
and the rivers, downtown Paramaribo, flora and fauna, and people in ethnic costumes.68
The first part of the song (in English, R&B) mainly celebrates the country’s natural
beauty and assets. This is followed by a rap full of optimism regarding the future. The
third part, in Dutch, again praises Suriname’s natural qualities and also the different
cultures living in peace. The last sentence is inclusive: “My Suriname, your Suriname,
our Suriname makes that we are Suriname.” The second rap is in Dutch, English, and
Sranan Tongo. Suriname is the best country in the world and the singer is proud to be
born and raised there and will never leave. The finale calls for Suriname to be unified
as one nation, to build for the future, and it invites others to come and meet.
A few things stand out when watching this video full of emotions. First, the lyrics are
universal. Replace “Suriname” and the text could be used by almost any post-colonial
country. Second, the use of three languages is puzzling: why the use of Dutch and Sranan
Tongo when the video is aimed at an international audience? This leads to a related, final
observation: the song seems directed at Surinamese people in Suriname rather than
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outsiders, as evidenced by lyrics like “Born and raised / Tied to where I am” and “our”
Suriname. “We are One” suggests that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was acting more like
a Ministry of Home Affairs or of Culture and Education by engaging in nation-building
rather than nation branding. The campaign ultimately did not catch on because of organ-
izational problems. The websites of Surinamese embassies in major countries such as the
United States, India, or Indonesia did not mention the campaign, nor did they show a link
to the video. Nor did the campaign get the expected (international) media attention. The
major problem seems to have been the mixed messages directed at different audiences.69
Conclusions
In this article, we have analyzed the trajectory of nation-building and nation branding in
Suriname. We underline that in both processes, the political–ideological mission to con-
struct a nation is paramount. As mentioned in our introduction, Suriname can be
regarded as both a “most likely” as well as a “least likely” candidate for nation-building
policies: most likely because the multi-ethnic population seems to require a clear strategy
to legitimize the state and to integrate the various population segments and create some
sense of shared nationhood and allegiance but least likely because the combination of a
traumatic colonial history, a multi-ethnic population, and economic or political instabil-
ity encumbers the implementation of successful nation-building policies. Reflecting on
this contradiction, we find that Surinamese governments have at different times
attempted to engage in nation-building but that the results were mixed at best. In the
1950s, nationalism and nation-building were regarded as an exclusively Creole project
and therefore had an adverse effect. In broadly similar fashion, the nation-building strat-
egies of the military regime failed because its advocates came to be seen not as builders
but as destroyers, thereby tarnishing Surinamese nationalism for decades to follow.
Our analysis of Suriname therefore confirms that nation-building is more challenging
in post-colonial, multi-ethnic societies. In these countries, divide-and-rule policies
devised by the colonial power are likely to have created a tense and antagonistic climate
between different cultural, ethnic, or religious groups, meaning that shared foundations
of nationhood are likely to be absent. If, under such circumstances, one ethnic group—
in this case the urban Creoles—expresses a need for nation-building, this is almost auto-
matically regarded with suspicion by other groups and is therefore likely to have the
opposite effect by invoking counterreactions. And if concepts like the nation, national
identity, or the attainment of independence become politicized along cultural or ethnic
lines, the social cohesion and sense of unity among the population will only further
erode. As a result, nation-building focusing on a single national identity in multi-ethnic
postcolonial societies seems virtually impossible.
On a more societal and cultural level, however, nation-building strategies in
Suriname have been more successful. Cultural expressions such as Wan Bon and Wan
Pipel have transformed the ethnic diversity of Suriname into a source of national pride,
meaning that the very absence of a dominant nation paradoxically became a key source
of the national identity. In this sense, Suriname emulates the example of larger multi-
ethnic countries like Brazil or South Africa, where Desmond Tutu’s notion of the
“rainbow nation” also takes diversity as a key element of the national identity. As we
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have discussed, initial and current attempts at nation branding also highlight
Suriname’s ethnic and cultural diversity as an asset that can be “sold” to an outside
audience. Though nation-building and nation branding are more difficult to materialize
in multi-ethnic, post-colonial societies, our article therefore also points to a possible
solution of this dilemma. If an accommodationalist approach to nation-building is
taken, cultural diversity itself could become the source of national identity and pride.
Yet some questions can be posed about the veracity and legitimacy of such strategies.
In the first place, though Suriname’s external nation-branding strategies tend to cele-
brate the country’s diversity and present its society as a happy mix of different but
seemingly equal cultures, domestically there is still a clearly discernible ethnic hierarchy
in which some groups occupy a much more marginal position than others. The
Maroons and Amerindians in the interior, for example, tend to be viewed as separate
peoples that are not fully included in the nation. Though nature is also part of contem-
porary nation-branding initiatives, this is also connected to ethnic pluralism: the lush
and “unspoiled” Suriname interior is exoticized as the homeland of “unique pre-modern
tribes” that have to a certain extent remained “untouched” by Western civilization.
Within Suriname, such “pre-modern” groups clearly assume an inferior position vis-
a-vis the urbanized Creole, Hindostani, and Javanese groups who live in Paramaribo or
the coastal areas or when these underprivileged groups move to the capital they are
often ranked as less “civilized.” Also excluded from the picture are more recent immi-
grants from countries such as Haiti, Brazil, and China.
In the second place, as happened in South Africa, the notion of “unity in diversity” can
also be criticized for sugar-coating persistent problems like corruption, crime, economic
stagnation, or hostile relations between groups.70 A similar tendency can be detected in
Suriname: though relations between ethnic groups are arguably quite harmonious, this
cannot disguise persistent problems regarding economic development, crime, or corrup-
tion. Obviously, such problems can be observed in virtually all countries in the Global
South, regardless of their levels of cultural and ethnic fragmentation.71 In addition to eth-
nic and cultural differences, an ever increasing income inequality—often the result of high
levels of un- and underemployment (especially among youth)—undermine solidarity and
loyalty, also within ethnic groups, thus even further complicating prospects of nation-
building and nation branding.72 In the end, therefore, nation-branding strategies that
emphasize “unity in diversity” ring hollow or might even sound quite cynical when under-
lying disparities between and within groups are not adequately addressed.
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